

ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH FILES

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REMARKS by STANSFIELD TURNER on
INTER-UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON ARMED FORCES
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REMARKS BY VICE ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER

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CHICAGO

Tonight I would like to share some thoughts with you concerning the future use of organized force, both in the world as a whole and as it relates to our own country.

Three topics which seem pertinent to me include: First, the general historical trend in the use of organized force and where we stand today relative to the long term trends. Second, the present state of world political order and what this portends for the employment of United States military power for the decade or two ahead. And, Third, the status of the United States military today and some of the problems it must overcome if it is to serve the national purpose successfully in the immediate future.

Turning to an assessment of the evolution of force and where we stand today, I would agree with Mr. Robert Osgood's perspective. He characterized the development of military technology from the pre-nation state era through the pre-Napoleonic era as being a relatively limited force which was gradually harnessed and made somewhat useful to the embryonic nation states of that day. From the Napoleonic Wars until the end of World War I, he traced the tremendous expansion of military power coincident with the industrial revolution in Europe and the United States, an expansion so great and so swift that political institutions of the period were unable to exercise adequate controls.

There were attempts by governments to reduce the causes of war before World War I, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 being prominent examples.

Between World Wars I and II we had even more efforts to control military force. The Kellogg-Briand Pact renounced war as an instrument of statecraft. The widely heralded Washington and London Naval Disarmament Treaties reduced naval strength among all signatories and maintained a freeze on battleship tonnage for 15 years.

These efforts failed to prevent World War II. Which brings us to the epoch commencing in 1945 in which we live, a period characterized by Robert Osgood as the regulatory phase in the evolution of force. The advent of nuclear weapons resulted simultaneously in a tremendous increase in available destructive power and ever increasing efforts by political institutions to achieve control over the new force.

World War II seems in retrospect to have been a conflict relatively free of excessive political control. The trend since has been to ever greater political restrictions on the use of force. To name but a few outstanding examples one can cite: (1) the Truman-MacArthur showdown over Korea, (2) the establishment of centralized control in the Department of Defense, (3) the lessened reliance on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the decision making process, (4) the designation of individual bombing targets in North Vietnam

from the White House on a day to day basis, (5) and, the elaborate fail safe devices and procedures devised to control release of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union also has demonstrated continuing concern with centralized political command and control: (1) the manner in which they manipulated their forces in the Cuban missile crisis, (2) the system by which political officers are assigned to parallel regular military command down to the unit level, (3) the way in which they maintained simultaneous tactical control over all their naval units deployed around the world during Exercise OKEAN, (4) Soviet willingness to limit naval incidents at sea and sign the SALT agreements, all are symptomatic of a trend which is accelerating, at least in the developed countries and especially in the superpowers.

I do not contend that this trend is anything but healthy because it may well help to prevent accidental disaster in the future. To be sure we have a long way to go in improving our command and control organization and equipment. The system has not always worked as intended in the past. One might cite the Lavelle incident, the Arnheiter affair, or My Lai as evidence that it hasn't worked well. But I would contend that these are exceptions rather than the rule. Furthermore, the mere fact that they came to light at all is evidence of tremendous change in the scope of control which is now exercised by the United States body

politic over its military organizations. Such incidents would most likely not have come to light at all 30 years ago, first because military commanders had much greater freedom of action in the field, and second because subordinates would not so readily have taken the initiative to expose what they observed to the nation at large.

In short, civil government at least in the developed nations is beginning to react to the tremendous growth in military power which has characterized the past century and a half and is taking steps to place effective controls on organized force by both unilateral and multilateral means.

Which brings me to the second point which I should like to discuss with you, that is, the present world order and what demands this may generate for United States military force. General recognition by the superpowers that there is rough nuclear parity, and that this condition is likely to continue for some time in the future, coupled with competing domestic requirements, have led to the current atmosphere of detente.

Some observers look into the future and wishfully see no end to detente, hence no need for forces. Some look ahead and see the existence of forces as a temptation that will undo detente. Others look ahead and theorize that the foundations of peace must rest on more enduring principles than the fear of physical punishment, hence seek the elimination of force and the threat of force today.

Still others view detente as just a tactical ploy by the Russians to gain time and access to Western technology. Even some Russians are convinced of this. We read just this month of nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov warning that fundamental Soviet attitudes may not change. And, there are disturbing reports that Chairman Breshnev has told his comrades that detente is a tactic to be employed for a decade or so, at which time the Soviets will be strong enough to abandon a policy of conciliation.

Speaking from the viewpoint of military professionals who will have to be responsible for national security if detente fails, it seems to me that:

- ° Detente is a fragile thing which we all hope will continue to grow.

- ° If the existence of military force imperils detente, an imbalance of force would be particularly dangerous. In order to have detente, each side must perceive a sense of security. In the present atmosphere, security will continue to consist of a series of recognized (although muted) threats that both sides feel willing and able to counter. It would be mere wishful thinking to conclude that threats no longer exist because sabers are not rattled, but merely carried at the ready.

- ° Although I share the concern of many that the Soviets may be using detente only as a short term

tactic, we must give detente a chance. The task of military professionals must be to advise the President, the Congress, and the general public of the risks inherent in each agreement which is proposed. We must also be alert to the fact that security is not necessarily synonymous with more weaponry. I would hope that in time we may also convince our Soviet colleagues that this is true.

- ° Detente will only be preserved if all parties come to trust the word and intent of the others through a series of gradual mutual adjustments in armaments. For the near term this may mean retaining what is obviously enough power to devastate each side several times over, because one or both sides may feel more secure with a large margin of retaliatory capability.

We must understand that whereas the United States has a tradition of geographic security, the Russian perception of security is profoundly influenced by a long history of being invaded from both the East and the West. The Soviets will perceive a requirement for a large military force for the foreseeable future in order to:

- ° Deter China
- ° Police the East European satellites
- ° Insure domestic security in a nation composed of many different nationalities
- ° Further the cause of their Marxist-Leninist ideology

We must also realize that there is not the same tradition of dislike for a large standing army as in our country. Nor is there any possibility of meaningful public dissent which would inhibit Soviet leadership from retaining a sizeable military establishment.

Thus, I foresee United States military power as being necessary in the next decade or two to provide strategic balance in three areas.

First, we must, by a careful combination of treaties, protocols, and strategic nuclear forces, maintain a rough balance among all the nuclear powers. Contrary to the hopes of many, this is not likely to lead to general and complete disarmament; rather it will be a continuing effort, hopefully multilateral, to exercise control over a fluctuating level of strategic armaments. This effort will be complicated by the continuing development of new weapons technology, possibly addition of new members to the nuclear club, and continuing shifts in relative economic power and political alignment among all nation states.

Rather than accepting agreement limiting one or two types of armament as a rationale for drastic cutbacks in all types of military forces, we must continue to proceed carefully toward arms limitations covering all types of weapons. Simultaneously, we must maintain the forces we do have at a high state of combat readiness and pursue a steady program of research and development, and modernization of weapons systems to counter potential threats.

Our goal should be to achieve as many freezes as we can negotiate on expensive new systems such as ABM. I strongly believe that it is impossible to prevent new technological discoveries by legislation, but we can control the application of new technology to weapons systems by mutual agreement among nations. This makes it imperative that we have a well managed ongoing Research and Development program and demonstrate a willingness to proceed with new weapons programs until we can reach specific agreements with other nations. We must learn from the mistakes of the 1930's and resolve not only to seek agreement on as many political and military issues as we can, but also to compete effectively in those areas where there is yet no arms limitation agreement. This is in essence the "bargaining-chip" strategy which we are currently trying to implement.

I see no immediate alternative to the strategy of mutual assured destruction which is the present basis for strategic deterrence. I should like to emphasize that mutual assured destruction need not necessarily be a strategy aimed at civilian populations.

In order to supplant mutual assured destruction, a successor strategy must contain built in positive incentives to dissuade any party from attacking the territory of the others. One solution to our current dilemma might be to so

thoroughly intermingle the economic interests of each nation state within the territory of the others that there would be a mutual self interest in not destroying the others' property. This raises questions of relations between multinational economic institutions and national sovereignty. Such a plan would also require juxtaposition of strategic weapons systems and economic complexes, at least in the initial stages, in order to preclude either side from opting for a counter-force strategy. Perhaps someday a melding of economic interests will provide a strong incentive for nation states to desist from threatening one another. However, I am not optimistic that it will occur in the next decade. Therefore, our first concern must be to maintain nuclear parity.

The second use for United States military forces must be to contribute to the strategic balance in Western Europe. This does not necessarily mean that the present force levels and the nature of weapons deployed must remain fixed in their current status.

Since the early 1960's, the United States has subscribed to a strategy of flexible response to possible Soviet incursions against NATO European territory. We have advocated that sufficient conventional forces be deployed by all the NATO allies to provide for a breathing spell between the first incursion by Warsaw Pact forces and the time when it might become necessary to escalate to nuclear war. Our allies have reluctantly agreed to this strategy and have contributed substantially to conventional forces in Europe. We in turn have attempted to provide a capability for our military to fight a sustained campaign in Central Europe by building a force with a heavy emphasis on logistic support.

There are several reasons why this strategy needs to be carefully reevaluated:

- The Soviets have not designed a force for prolonged struggle. Rather, they have emphasized the capability for a short massive blow which could not be sustained very long because their logistics train is inadequate for the task.

- o Our allies have designed forces with a potential for perhaps more sustained combat than the Warsaw Pact but certainly not for a prolonged conventional war.
 - o If we attempt to afford the dollars to support a sustained conventional war fighting capability in Central Europe there will be little else in our inventory of military capability.
 - o The Soviets are unlikely to attempt such a war because of the danger of escalation; because of the threat of China and because of their trouble retaining tight controls on their current East European satellites. They are more interested in exercising a larger measure of political influence over western Europe than in conquering it and having to control it like the eastern satellites. For these reasons we may find it advantageous to:
 - ° Bargain together with our Allies for Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR); perhaps difficult to achieve because of Soviet requirements for internal security.
 - ° Restructure our forces in Europe with greater emphasis on defensive weapons, smaller more mobile units, and redeployment within Europe based on the realities of the terrain rather than artificial constraints such as national boundaries and historical accident resulting from World War II.
 - ° Reduce the logistic tail necessary for a long conventional war and increase the ratio of combat troops vis-a-vis support troops in Europe. We should also
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consider frequent unit rotation between Europe and the United States as a substitute for the lengthy individual tours with the large number of dependents which characterize present deployments.

° Plan on rapid small unit replacement and reinforcement from the United States in the event of hostilities or increased tension, rather than individual replacement as is presently contemplated.

The mission of United States forces committed to Europe will most likely evolve from one of fighting a sustained conflict to that of supporting Western Europe against political pressure from the Soviets and maintaining a capability to fight a short, perhaps unexpected defensive war against powerful but short-legged offensive forces.

A third use of United States military force will be to deter major power dominance in the Third World. Only the United States can perform this function. Thus there is some rationalization of effort here with our European allies carrying a larger share of the central front load, and we tending to the free world's interests around the globe. Note that I did not say that we should police the Third World. United States interests will best be served for the foreseeable future if Third World nations are permitted the freedom to work out their own destinies. Unfortunately, they may not be left alone simply because the United States may choose to withdraw forces. The Soviet Union's naval building program,

coupled with its radical change in deployment patterns over the past decade, the many statements by their CNO, Admiral Gorshkov, and their interest in obtaining basing and logistics support facilities in strategic locations, all point to new Soviet awareness of the persuasive power of military presence.

Even though the United States will be less likely to use overt force in Third World areas, the capability for a counter presence will be necessary. Without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect Third World nations to succumb to military pressures. For example, one might reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. Even though the United States is not a formal ally of Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well have been the latent potential support which permitted him to take the action he did. No matter what some people say, our interests overseas are growing not declining. We are increasingly dependent on imports. That in turn means that we must export more. In addition, despite what some of our eastern press would have us believe, I am confident that the people of this country will not turn their backs on the contribution that our example and support can give to those struggling for what we accept as our heritage.

I foresee an evolution in the nature of United States presence overseas. This does not imply complete withdrawal of United States forces from areas where they have maintained a presence since World War II. Over a prolonged period it may mean replacing presence in force with token presence backed by the capability to rapidly deploy reinforcements from the United States if circumstances require it. Nor does it imply that overt use of United States forces must be the rule. Presence may be sufficient to the task if our interests are manifestly apparent to all concerned and our will to persevere is credible. Hopefully such a strategy will induce abstention on the part of the major powers and discourage adventurism on the part of Third World nations themselves, either of which could be dangerously escalatory.

To review, then, I foresee three uses for United States military forces in the next two decades. First, strategic nuclear forces must balance potential enemies in order to deter nuclear war. Second, conventional general purpose forces must be sufficient to provide that type and size of contribution to NATO defenses which will buttress our allies from acceding to pressures from the Soviet Union, including any efforts to use their new naval power as a wedge against nations on the NATO flanks, or for that matter against the Japanese in the Pacific

Third, we need sufficient general purpose forces to deter major power dominance in the Third World and protect United States interests abroad. We need not match potential opponents measure for measure but we must demonstrate a continual willingness to maintain a sufficiently broad spectrum of capabilities so as to make overt use of force seem very risky to an adversary. Once force is actually employed in the future it will lose much of its persuasive power. Furthermore, despite the trend /I mentioned earlier there is always a danger that forces in war will be less susceptible to political control. This makes it even more important that our military organization and our diplomatic pronouncements are credible so that we need resort to combat only rarely. Latent force will be the most useful weapon in the decade ahead.

This brings me to the third topic I should like to touch upon this evening. That is some of the problems which the United States military must deal with in the next few years. As I indicated earlier the principal task of United States military forces should be deterrence. This demands that the military profession relook at how we shape and employ our military in light of the changing perils of force and aspirations of many people to avoid its use. We must be more concerned with perceptions of the opponent than we have in the past, while at the same time being careful not

to neglect the force requirements which would be necessary should hostilities actually occur. In the past few years, we have used a set of possible war scenarios as justification for structuring our forces. We have tended to pick the worst case as criteria for force and individual weapons design and assumed that preparing for a worst case automatically gave us the capability to handle less demanding wars elsewhere in the world. Vietnam taught us the danger of this approach. The Navy is consciously endeavoring to achieve a more balanced force consisting of a few very capable and relatively expensive units together with a somewhat larger number of units which are less costly yet still capable of performing a spectrum of tasks, particularly in areas where the threat is not as large as it is in the worst case scenario. Absence of a clearly defined threat scenario such as we have had for the Cold War period will make it much more difficult to predict future force level requirements.

Assuming that we can learn to cope with this more difficult task of identifying and explaining requirements for latent military force we face an increasingly difficult task in convincing the Congress and the public of our long term requirements. The general public would like to forget Vietnam and the military and concentrate on domestic problems. Unfortunately, it requires 7 to 10 years to produce sophisticated weapons, so the military must procure in time of peace what it may need in war.

In addition to problems involving hardware modernization which tend to receive the greatest publicity, all the services face unprecedented personnel problems. Vietnam brought us the opportunities of a stable well paid all volunteer force, but the disadvantages of having to compete in the marketplace for talented people.

I think it is safe to say that there will have to be a series of adjustments, some dramatic, over the next several years to tailor the compensation programs, terms of enlistment, and recruiting programs to meet the special needs of each service. For example, the Army has had difficulty meeting its recruiting goals for the past six months. On the other hand the Air Force more than met its goal in July and the Navy was very close to its goal. Each service may evolve radically different programs to correct such imbalances.

We in the military will be challenged to retain our most talented men and women. Perhaps one answer might be to offer young people the opportunity to contract before they commence military service for a decade of military service in exchange for graduate level education. This medium term of service would provide educational advantage to our youth and provide the services with highly trained individuals without committing either party to a long term contract. The service would not be burdened with an excess of people who must be

retained until statutory retirement. The individual would be assured of a marketable skill to provide him with job security when his service contract expired. A similar program could be instituted to obtain the technical skills needed in the enlisted ranks.

There are many other manpower management questions which will require some in depth study accompanied by much trial and error experimentation. Many of our current operating procedures and equipment designs need reevaluation in view of the fact that men are now much less a free good than they were only three years ago. The military can learn a great deal from civilian industry and the academic world, I am sure. In order to facilitate transfer of ideas we might want to develop programs to accept civilians into the military at their mid-career points for limited periods of service or even for the remainder of their productive years. I do not rule out the possibility of accepting individuals into the services at the flag and general officer level if they have specific skills that are required.

Naturally, there will be some problems with job security and retirement benefits, but these questions are of concern to the nation at large. We are all going to have to come to grips with the problem of providing vested retirement credits to a mobile work force.

I would like to provide ample opportunity for questions so I will close my formal remarks by quickly reviewing three major points which I hope you will consider carefully:

First - military force must be and will be subjected to much more comprehensive political control in the future. This control to be effective will demand a more enlightened, continuous, less emotional public interest in the problems of military security than we have experienced in this century.

Second - the level of military forces will not revert to what we knew in the 1930's because geography is no longer our defensive shield. We will be required to maintain forces which complement those of other nations and supplement a system of arms agreements which may grow more and more comprehensive. Many forces will be designed and deployed primarily to deter war rather than primarily to engage in actual sustained combat. Latent force will be a much more powerful influence than overt force.

Third - social change, coupled with the requirement for substantial active duty military forces and a ready reserve will place unprecedented demands for talented military personnel at a time when military service is less popular than ever. We who now hold the top management positions in the uniformed services are continually exploring new ways to attract and keep good people working with us.

10-15-73
Handwritten

Speed
F

Krasnik

Purpose - keep young men/women military career feeling married to a curse.

Have challenges - makes stimulating

Grateful IUS exists and grateful participate

Serious discussion way solve problems

Discuss consider principal problem

Define purpose - mission

Start recognizing utility diminished for political purpose

4 reasons

1. Most Obvious nuclear parity

Super power confrontation too dangerous

Same for major allies of super power

2. Major power, operating under US type ground rules, could not achieve political advantage in small country with large military force, Vietnam

Because - limited war vs, total war

- Tech supplied to minor power sufficient

To seriously complicate fighting

3. Greater interest in economic welfare than political conquest

Politicians concerned with improving

domestic standard of living over

yesterday - not being better than Japanese,

British, etc. Leads to commonality of interests.

because economic game not zero - sum

4. Western world acceptability down

Communications - sense of world community

Communications - humanitarianism juices up -

Popularity word detente

Not overdo -

3rd World

Lesser developed

Focus - underdeveloped

Dangers

1) Super power involvement

2) Major power

dominance - surrogate or direct power

Raw materials

3 missions

1. Strategic nuclear deterrence

2. Military balance W. Europe

Non-mil deter Soviets

Reassure allies - linkage

3. Military balance 3rd World

Deter adventurism major power

Contain conflicts

Common characteristic

Deterrence emphasis -

Vice defense or war fighting.

If this is a new thrust - cause problems

Mention 3

1. Design military forces for deterrence

Define

(Deterrence- Discourage enemy by confronting with unacceptable risks, ^{i.e.,} ~~i.e.,~~ work on enemy intentions)

(Defense - Reducing our cost and risk-in event deterrence fails, i.e., reduce enemy capability)

Proverbial to say that because intentions can change quickly, we must plan based on enemy capabilities,

That is rapidly becoming unhelpful response,

Technology has pushed costs weapons so high, we have only two choices if we plan against enemy capabilities - a defense force:

- 1) Limit the areas which we are prepared to defend - probably to Europe
- 2) Only be partially prepared for worldwide defense requirements.

Whichever choice we make, we are in effect estimating intentions - that is we estimate either that Europe is the primary threat area or we estimate that we can take a chance by having inadequate air defense forces, sea control forces, anti-tank forces or something else that we require to be prepared on all fronts

In essence this is part of the difficult time we are having in acknowledging that the power of the United States is indeed limited.

Really we are hoping that our force structure will somehow be adequate if we must defend, even if define threat downward

Should we not give more attention to the requirements of deterring conflict? ^{Difficult.} Our ~~difficult~~ primary force sizing technique is the analysis of tactical warfighting in specific scenarios, deterrence is less amenable to scenario definition or to analysis.

This is because ~~in part~~ deter is perceptions - number

1. Soviets
2. 3rd expect Sov help
3. 3rd
4. Combo

We don't know much of impact mil force on perceptions

Navy - gunboat

Nearest - Largest

Credible - applicable

Supersonic vs Airborne

Mil - Intell

Need study operative factors mil presence.

2. If deterrence more difficult define more difficult sell

Congress - public

If talk - deterrence as balance - stabilizing vice defense-superiority - need less - get less

Euphoria of detente

Fragile - careful not appear want it to fail.

Study detente

Particularly fragile if let imbalance develop -

Could not risk

Would not forsake advantage

Containment

Recognize asymmetries in U.S. Soviet approach to detent

1. Double detente

2. Soviet Force needs China, E Europe - Domestic
Forces Soviets maintain will be perceived as
threat

For moment, no reason believe won't exercise
threat e.g., Naval build up perceived threat
not perceived by intellectuals

Japan

Norway

Still stuck on scenarios and analyses

Need study relationship mil threat and pol/econ

Touch lightly

3. Less Utility - More difficult explain purpose -

Attract young men and women

Issue: How ^afor sacrifice standards, procedures to accomodate to
society

Make more attractive?

Must look at fundamentals

Superficial proposal require M.A. for LCOL

By #'s - flower/roots

Instead - look what separates us - exclusiveness -

Housing

PX

Commissaries

Hospitals

Sense of dedicated career vs job

Lateral movement Flag

Job Coding for transferability

Less indentured servitude

Greater intellectual contact with civilian academics -
don't add layer

Abolish Academics, PG, WC, PDP

Rather scoff domestic action contaminating

society - increase-contaminate military

Need study what essential - discipline , auth

Flogging

McMahon

CHICAGO SPEECH

I'd like to discuss what I consider to be the principle problem facing the military today; how to define our purpose or mission. I believe we should start by recognizing the diminishing utility of military force as a means of furthering political purpose. There are four reasons for this. The first and most obvious is the advent of nuclear weapons, and in particular the Soviet achievement of nuclear parity with the U.S. . It is simply out of the question for the super powers to consider resolving their differences with military force. Nor should any of the major allies of the super powers consider using either conventional or nuclear force to solve their problems.

Secondly, both Korea and Vietnam have taught us the very real limitations on the ability of a major military power to exercise its will over a minor power through use of military force. In part this is because the major power is almost always fighting a limited war for limited objectives, whereas the minor power is fighting a total war for survival. Further with the dispersal of technology a small power can obtain enough sophisticated equipment and learn enough about its operation to give a major power a very difficult time.

Thirdly, today the powers of the world are becoming more concerned with improvement of their economic position rather of their political position. Politicians are concerned with

a steady improvement of the country's standard of living, not with comparison to the standards of country X or country Y. Thus military force is less applicable to furthering economic issues in what is a non-zero sum game.

Fourthly, within the Western world at least, the acceptability of the use of military force has declined. With instant world wide communications, there is a greater sense of world community today. There is also a greater appreciation of the horrors of war and a professed humanitarianism. Out of this, in part, comes the popularity of the word detente.

We do not want to overdo this concept of diminishing utility of military force. Many countries in the world still feel that they can benefit from the use of force. Many others feel insecure under the threat of force. They have only to look at the Middle East situation, the continuing strife in Cambodia, the India-Pakistan conflict, and many other small conflicts in recent years. These conflicts seem to focus on the lesser developed countries of the Third World, Israel, Pakistan, India and Indonesia, etc., rather than the very underdeveloped countries. The major powers have considerable interest in these potential conflicts. On the one hand, there is always the danger that they will lead to super power involvement. The Middle East situation is a classic example. On the other hand the United States does not want another major power obtaining dominance in some area of the third world through the use of either direct or surrogate military

power. The major powers are becoming increasingly dependent upon the import of raw materials from these areas and all would be concerned at such a development.

From this there seem to me to be three missions which are likely to dominate military force planning in the decade ahead. The first is obviously the maintenance of strategic nuclear deterrence. It appears to me that we must consider alternatives to mutual assured destruction. In many ways this concept is responsible for the apathy or sense of opposition on the part of the citizenry toward military forces.

A second mission is the maintenance of a military balance in Western Europe. The political and economic factors are now of greater importance than military in deterring an actual Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The use of our military forces, however, is of considerable importance in reassuring our Western European allies that there is a linkage between our nuclear power and their vulnerability to invade.

Thirdly, we need to maintain some form of military balance in the Third World. We want to be able to deter adventurism by major powers and to contain conflicts which may develop between Third World powers themselves.

The common characteristic in these three missions is an emphasis on deterrence vice defense or warfighting. If this is in fact a new thrust in United States military force planning there are at least three substantial problems which we must be prepared to face.

First, it is difficult for the uniformed military to design its forces for deterrence rather than defense. By deterrence, I mean forces which will discourage an enemy by confronting him with unacceptable risks. Here, we are working with the enemy's intentions. By defense, I mean reducing our cost and risk in the event deterrence fails. Now we are working against the enemy's capability. The proverbial response that because enemy intentions can change quickly we must base our plans on enemy capabilities is in my view rapidly becoming unhelpful. Technology has pushed the costs of weapons so high that we have only two choices if we plan against enemy capability by developing a defense force. The first is to limit the areas in which we are prepared to defend, probably in Western Europe. The second, is to be only partially prepared for world wide defense requirements. Whichever choice we make we are, in effect, estimating intentions. We are estimating either that Europe is a primary threat area or that we can take a chance with inadequate air defense forces, sea control forces, anti-tank forces, or something else that we do require to be prepared on all fronts. In essence this is part of the difficulty we are having in acknowledging the limited power of the United States. Really we are hoping that our force structure will somehow be adequate if we must defend. Sometimes, however, we find we have to redefine the thread downward in order to be reassured. Should we not give more attention to the requirements of deterring conflict?

For those of us in uniform this is difficult because our primary force sizing technique is the analysis of tactical warfighting in specific scenarios. Deterrence is less amenable to scenario definition or to analysis. This is true in part because deterrence relies on perceptions, and there are a number of perceptions we must consider.

One of these is the perceptions of the Soviets. Second, we must consider perceptions of a Third World power which hopes to be given assistance by the Soviets. In this case, the perception by the Third World country of the relative balance between us and the Soviets and our relative ability to bring force to bear on the situation is important. This perception may, in fact, be quite different from the Soviet or U.S. perception of the same situation. A Third situation is when third world countries simply must look at what we can do to them without any Soviet interference. Of course, it's possible that several of these perceptions may be working at the same time. Unfortunately, we do not know much about the impact of military force on perceptions like this. In the Navy for instance there is always a tendency when called upon for gunboat diplomacy to send the nearest ship. If there is a choice it is always in favor of the largest and most powerful ship. Yet there are times when the largest and most powerful is not the most credible or the most applicable to that particular situation. Supersonic airplanes are likely

to be a small threat to a very underdeveloped nation whereas a marine helicopter assault on the capital of a country may be very meaningful indeed. Overall, we need considerably more study on the operative factors of military presence or deterrence.

Second if deterrence is more difficult to define or difficult to understand than warfighting and defense we are going to have a greater problem selling this program to the Congress and the public. If we talk of deterrence in terms of balance or in Morris' words "stabilizing," rather than in terms of defense and superiority, the obvious conclusion will be that we need less. If we ask for less we will probably get much less. The best bureaucratic strategy may well be to continue to play up the threat and ask for forces for warfighting capability in the hope that we will have enough for a deterrent strategy.

There is great danger today in the euphoria of detente which pervades in the Congress. After sitting though three days of Pacem in Terris with Congressmen, intellectuals, businessmen and others of stature in the communities, I can assure you that there is a lot of sloppy euphoric thinking about the term "detente." Detente is, in face, a fragile thing.

Coming down here on the airplane yesterday I was reading a column in the Washington Post, which states "detente is finished". On September 27th the Soviet Union knew what day and the fact

that the Arabs were going to attack Israel. They did not tell us and therefore they have betrayed detente. I believe the author of that column to be taking an over simplistic view of idealized detente. He is making no allowance for the constantly changing nature of detente. It is a progression forward and sometimes backward in time into a state of trust and confidence. Our present stage of detente is nowhere near the kind of trust and confidence which permits us to reveal that sort of information.

We need to study and probe into the meaning of detente. If an imbalance in military force (conventional and strategic) develops between us and the Soviet Union in particular, we will not have detente. If either of our countries felt vulnerable to attack by the other, we could not risk detente. Similarly, if either of us felt we had a marked military advantage over the other, I suggest that we would not be likely to forsake it. History has not shown many cases of countries forsaking an advantage over a rival. I believe this though I consider the U.S. the most magnanimous country in the history of the world, one that when it possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons for five years or so pressed for a policy of containment not detente.

We must now recognize the asymmetries that exist in the U.S. and Soviet approaches to detente. I believe that one of the reasons the Soviet Union, Red China, and the U.S. have agreed to detente was that all three of us did not want to have

opponents on two fronts. But instead of us each dropping one opponent and keeping one in a triangular situation we now have double detente. I think that is going to have an impact on the attitudes in our country and in the Soviet Union towards detente.

Further the Soviets have different needs for military forces. If I were a Soviet military leader I would be very genuinely reluctant to reduce my forces when I considered my responsibilities on the eastern front. If I were a Soviet military leader I would be equally reluctant when I thought of my responsibilities in the eastern European nations. If I were a Soviet political leader I would be reluctant to have military forces reduced too much, due to a tradition in history of using force to preserve domestic order and security. After all, the Soviet have not the tradition of anti-militarism we inherited from our founding fathers.

As an aside, I also see no reason to believe that the Soviets will not exercise the force they have to threaten other people. They are clearly building up their Navy to a far greater extent than their legitimate requirement. Even if they do not purposely exercise force their possession of forces for these three legitimate purposes will be perceived as a threat by many other nations. I suggest here again that we in our community need to do more thinking about perceived threats.

A few days ago I was talking with an academic civilian involved in a study on Japanese security requirements. Inevitably and very quickly we were in conversation about the very long jugular from the Persian Gulf to Japan. I said, "what would you have the Japanese do." And he said that it was so long, so difficult to defend, that there is no point in their building naval forces to protect it. I suggest this is a misunderstanding of perceptions of military power. There is a major difference between a zero degree threshold at which another power can exercise threat with military force against one of your vitals and a 10, 20, or 30 percent capability. I may be wrong but I think we need to be sure that we understand more about the perceptions of threat, how they affect political and economic decisions of countries.

While in Europe a few weeks ago, I read in the British newspapers that the Norwegians have discovered oil in their coastal waters, their own territorial waters. But the Norwegians have come to feel that the Norwegian Sea is a Soviet lake; so they have elected to develop those oil fields only in the very southern part of their coast line.

Lastly, I would like to touch very briefly (because I have run overtime and also because there are many of you here who are far more expert in this field than I) on the problem we will have explaining the purpose of a military force which has less utility today. Recruiting and retaining the young men and women necessary to man our forces will be more difficult.

I think the most interesting issue is; how much do we need to sacrifice our standards, our procedures, our traditions, our practices in order to accommodate to our society. How much do we need to do to make military life more compatible with that which young people enjoy in civilian society. Here we must really examine fundamentals.

Today, I was disappointed in what I consider a very superficial proposal for bringing the military into harmony with civilian society; to ensure that every Lieutenant Colonel has a civilian master's degree. To me this is a by-the-numbers approach. We will succeed only in watering the buds, and would not feed the roots. Instead I think we must look at what separates us in the military from the civilian society. The principal thing is the sense of exclusiveness, which has been and still is very important. Although it is one of those morale items which builds esprit can we afford it? Can we afford housing on the bases or should we give it to the civilians? Can we afford PX's, commissaries, and hospitals for our dependents? Can we give young people the sense of coming into a dedicated career when they join the military rather than taking another job? All of us who made it a career and love the military are proud of our profession. We like feeling that we are an elite and distinct profession. But if we want to be closer to the civilian society can we afford the elitism? _____

Must we provide for greater lateral movement, out and in. Two weeks ago I talked to a group of civilian businessmen and suggested we permit lateral entry even at flag and general rank. A lot of hands went up and volunteered. I told how much I got paid and most of them came down.

In this same connection, should we consider coding our jobs in the military to bring them into line with those in civilian life. If we provide a greater transferability, a young man need not hasten out of the military to ensure that he is going to be able to establish and qualify himself for a job in civilian life. Should we have less indentured servitude? Perhaps we should require only 18 months of military service, as I understand the British do.

If we need greater intellectual contact between military officers and civilian academics, we need not add another layer of unnecessary education. We should consider abolishing the service academies, post graduate schools, and even the war colleges and putting that education into civilian institutions. Perhaps we should also look for a mandatory program for officers being promoted to LCOL and perhaps enlisted men to Gunnery Sergeant in which they would take a year off from the military service to work in civilian industry in some corresponding job. Finally rather than scoffing at domestic action as did some people who fear we may contaminate society, perhaps we should increase domestic action programs and contaminate the military with civilian mores.

Overall I believe we need to study what is essential to maintaining order and discipline in the military to achieve a better understanding of which of our traditions and practices can be abandoned and which must be preserved.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

02840

27 SEP 1973

FROM: President, Naval War College
TO: Office of CNO (OP 921E)
SUBJ: Speech clearance; request for
REF: (a) Paragraph B-3007, U.S. Navy Public Affairs
Regulations
ENCL: (1) Seven copies of speech to Inter-University
Seminar on Armed Forces and Society in Chicago.

1. In accordance with reference. (a), it is requested
that the enclosed speech be cleared for presentation
to the Chicago Seminar on 11 October 1973.



DAVID G. CLARK
by direction

9/27/73

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CHICAGO

Tonight I would like to share some thoughts with you concerning the future use of organized force, both in the world as a whole and as it relates to our own country. Three topics which seem pertinent to me include: First, the general historical trend in the use of organized force and where we stand today relative to the long term trends. Second, the present state of world political order and what this portends for the employment of United States military power for the decade or two ahead. And, Third, the status of the United States military today and some of the problems it must overcome if it is to serve the national purpose successfully in the immediate future.

Turning to an assessment of the evolution of force and where we stand today, I would agree with Mr. Robert Osgood's perspective. He characterized the development of military technology from the pre-nation state era through the pre-Napoleonic era as being a relatively limited force which was gradually harnessed and made somewhat useful to the embryonic nation states of that day. From the Napoleonic Wars until the end of World War I, he traced the tremendous expansion of military power coincident with the industrial revolution in Europe and the United States, an expansion so great and so swift that political institutions of the period were unable to exercise adequate controls.

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There were attempts by governments to reduce the causes of war before World War I, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 being prominent examples.

Between World Wars I and II we had even more efforts to control military force. The Kellogg-Briand Pact renounced war as an instrument of statecraft. The widely heralded Washington and London Naval Disarmament Treaties reduced naval strength among all signatories and maintained a freeze on battleship tonnage for 15 years.

These efforts failed to prevent World War II. Which brings us to the epoch commencing in 1945 in which we live, a period characterized by Robert Osgood as the regulatory phase in the evolution of force. The advent of nuclear weapons resulted simultaneously in a tremendous increase in available destructive power and ever increasing efforts by political institutions to achieve control over the new force.

World War II seems in retrospect to have been a conflict relatively free of excessive political control. The trend since has been to ever greater political restrictions on the use of force. To name but a few outstanding examples one can cite: (1) the Truman-MacArthur showdown over Korea, (2) the establishment of centralized control in the Department of Defense, (3) the lessened reliance on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the decision making process, (4) the designation of individual bombing targets in North Vietnam

from the White House on a day to day basis, (5) and, the elaborate fail safe devices and procedures devised to control release of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union also has demonstrated continuing concern with centralized political command and control: (1) the manner in which they manipulated their forces in the Cuban missile crisis, (2) the system by which political officers are assigned to parallel regular military command down to the unit level, (3) the way in which they maintained simultaneous tactical control over all their naval units deployed around the world during Exercise OKEAN, (4) Soviet willingness to limit naval incidents at sea and sign the SALT agreements, all are symptomatic of a trend which is accelerating, at least in the developed countries and especially in the superpowers.

I do not contend that this trend is anything but healthy because it may well help to prevent accidental disaster in the future. To be sure we have a long way to go in improving our command and control organization and equipment. The system has not always worked as intended in the past. One might cite the Lavelle incident, the Arnheiter affair, or My Lai as evidence that it hasn't worked well. But I would contend that these are exceptions rather than the rule. Furthermore, the mere fact that they came to light at all is evidence of tremendous change in the scope of control which is now exercised by the United States body

politic over its military organizations. Such incidents would most likely not have come to light at all 30 years ago, first because military commanders had much greater freedom of action in the field, and second because subordinates would not so readily have taken the initiative to expose what they observed to the nation at large.

In short, civil government at least in the developed nations is beginning to react to the tremendous growth in military power which has characterized the past century and a half and is taking steps to place effective controls on organized force by both unilateral and multilateral means.

Which brings me to the second point which I should like to discuss with you, that is, the present world order and what demands this may generate for United States military force. General recognition by the superpowers that there is rough nuclear parity, and that this condition is likely to continue for some time in the future, coupled with competing domestic requirements, have led to the current atmosphere of detente.

Some observers look into the future and wishfully see no end to detente, hence no need for forces. Some look ahead and see the existence of forces as a temptation that will undo detente. Others look ahead and theorize that the foundations of peace must rest on more enduring principles than the fear of physical punishment, hence seek the elimination of force and the threat of force today.

Still others view detente as just a tactical ploy by the Russians to gain time and access to Western technology. Even some Russians are convinced of this. We read just this month of nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov warning that fundamental Soviet attitudes may not change. And, there are disturbing reports that Chairman Breshnev has told his comrades that detente is a tactic to be employed for a decade or so, at which time the Soviets will be strong enough to abandon a policy of conciliation.

Speaking from the viewpoint of military professionals who will have to be responsible for national security if detente fails, it seems to me that:

- ° Detente is a fragile thing which we all hope will continue to grow.

- ° If the existence of military force imperils detente, an imbalance of force would be particularly dangerous. In order to have detente, each side must perceive a sense of security. In the present atmosphere, security will continue to consist of a series of recognized (although muted) threats that both sides feel willing and able to counter. It would be mere wishful thinking to conclude that threats no longer exist because sabers are not rattled, but merely carried at the ready.

- ° Although I share the concern of many that the Soviets may be using detente only as a short term

tactic, we must give detente a chance. The task of military professionals must be to advise the President, the Congress, and the general public of the risks inherent in each agreement which is proposed. We must also be alert to the fact that security is not necessarily synonymous with more weaponry. I would hope that in time we may also convince our Soviet colleagues that this is true.

° Detente will only be preserved if all parties come to trust the word and intent of the others through a series of gradual mutual adjustments in armaments. For the near term this may mean retaining what is obviously enough power to devastate each side several times over, because one or both sides may feel more secure with a large margin of retaliatory capability.

We must understand that whereas the United States has a tradition of geographic security, the Russian perception of security is profoundly influenced by a long history of being invaded from both the East and the West. The Soviets will perceive a requirement for a large military force for

the foreseeable future in order to:

- ° Deter China
- ° Police the East European satellites
- ° Insure domestic security in a nation composed of many different nationalities
- ° Further the cause of their Marxist-Leninist ideology

We must also realize that there is not the same tradition of dislike for a large standing army as in our country. Nor is there any possibility of meaningful public dissent which would inhibit Soviet leadership from retaining a sizeable military establishment.

Thus, I foresee United States military power as being necessary in the next decade or two to provide strategic balance in three areas.

First, we must, by a careful combination of treaties, protocols, and strategic nuclear forces, maintain a rough balance among all the nuclear powers. Contrary to the hopes of many, this is not likely to lead to general and complete disarmament; rather it will be a continuing effort, hopefully multilateral, to exercise control over a fluctuating level of strategic armaments. This effort will be complicated by the continuing development of new weapons technology, possibly addition of new members to the nuclear club, and continuing shifts in relative economic power and political alignment among all nation states.

Rather than accepting agreement limiting one or two types of armament as a rationale for drastic cutbacks in all types of military forces, we must continue to proceed carefully toward arms limitations covering all types of weapons. Simultaneously, we must maintain the forces we do have at a high state of combat readiness and pursue a steady program of research and development, and modernization of weapons systems to counter potential threats.

Our goal should be to achieve as many freezes as we can negotiate on expensive new systems such as ABM. I strongly believe that it is impossible to prevent new technological discoveries by legislation, but we can control the application of new technology to weapons systems by mutual agreement among nations. This makes it imperative that we have a well managed ongoing Research and Development program and demonstrate a willingness to proceed with new weapons programs until we can reach specific agreements with other nations. We must learn from the mistakes of the 1930's and resolve not only to seek agreement on as many political and military issues as we can, but also to compete effectively in those areas where there is yet no arms limitation agreement. This is in essence the "bargaining-chip" strategy which we are currently trying to implement.

I see no immediate alternative to the strategy of mutual assured destruction which is the present basis for strategic deterrence. I should like to emphasize that mutual assured destruction need not necessarily be a strategy aimed at civilian populations.

In order to supplant mutual assured destruction, a successor strategy must contain built in positive incentives to dissuade any party from attacking the territory of the others. One solution to our current dilemma might be to so

thoroughly intermingle the economic interests of each nation state within the territory of the others that there would be a mutual self interest in not destroying the others' property. This raises questions of relations between multinational economic institutions and national sovereignty. Such a plan would also require juxtaposition of strategic weapons systems and economic complexes, at least in the initial stages, in order to preclude either side from opting for a counter-force strategy. Perhaps someday a melding of economic interests will provide a strong incentive for nation states to desist from threatening one another. However, I am not optimistic that it will occur in the next decade. Therefore, our first concern must be to maintain nuclear parity.

The second use for United States military forces must
be to contribute to the strategic balance in Western Europe. This
does not necessarily mean that the present force levels and the nature of weapons deployed must remain fixed in their current status.

Since the early 1960's, the United States has subscribed to a strategy of flexible response to possible Soviet incursions against NATO European territory. We have advocated that sufficient conventional forces be deployed by all the NATO allies to provide for a breathing spell between the first incursion by Warsaw Pact forces and the time when it might become necessary to escalate to nuclear war. Our allies have reluctantly agreed to this strategy and have contributed substantially to conventional forces in Europe. We in turn have attempted to provide a capability for our military to fight a sustained campaign in Central Europe by building a force with a heavy emphasis on logistic support.

There are several reasons why this strategy needs to be carefully reevaluated:

- ° The Soviets have not designed a force for prolonged struggle. Rather, they have emphasized the capability for a short massive blow which could not be sustained very long because their logistics train is inadequate for the task.

- o Our allies have designed forces with a potential for perhaps more sustained combat than the Warsaw Pact but certainly not for a prolonged conventional war.
- o If we attempt to afford the dollars to support a sustained conventional war fighting capability in Central Europe there will be little else in our inventory of military capability.
- o The Soviets are unlikely to attempt such a war because of the danger of escalation; because of the threat of China and because of their trouble retaining tight controls on their current East European satellites. They are more interested in exercising a larger measure of political influence over Western Europe than in conquering it and having to control it like the eastern satellites.

For these reasons we may find it advantageous to:

- ° Bargain together with our Allies for Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR); perhaps difficult to achieve because of Soviet requirements for internal security.
- ° Restructure our forces in Europe with greater emphasis on defensive weapons, smaller more mobile units, and redeployment within Europe based on the realities of the terrain rather than artificial constraints such as national boundaries and historical accident resulting from World War II.
- ° Reduce the logistic tail necessary for a long conventional war and increase the ratio of combat troops vis-a-vis support troops in Europe. We should also

the United States as a substitute for the lengthy
individual tours with the large number of dependents
which characterize present deployments.

° Plan on rapid small unit replacement and reinforcement
from the United States in the event of hostilities or
increased tension, rather than individual replacement
as is presently contemplated.

The mission of United States forces committed to Europe
will most likely evolve from one of fighting a sustained
conflict to that of supporting Western Europe against poli-
tical pressure from the Soviets and maintaining a capability
to fight a short, perhaps unexpected defensive war against
powerful but short-legged offensive forces.

A third use of United States military force will be to
deter major power dominance in the Third World. Only the
United States can perform this function. Thus there is some
rationalization of effort here with our European allies carry-
ing a larger share of the central front load, and we tending to
the free world's interests around the globe. Note that I did
not say that we should police the Third World. United States
interests will best be served for the foreseeable future if
Third World nations are permitted the freedom to work
out their own destinies. Unfortunately, they may not be
left alone simply because the United States may choose to
withdraw forces. The Soviet Union's naval building program,

coupled with its radical change in deployment patterns over the past decade, the many statements by their CNO, Admiral Gorshkov, and their interest in obtaining basing and logistics support facilities in strategic locations, all point to new Soviet awareness of the persuasive power of military presence.

Even though the United States will be less likely to use overt force in Third World areas, the capability for a counter presence will be necessary. Without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect Third World nations to succumb to military pressures. For example, one might reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. Even though the United States is not a formal ally of Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well have been the latent potential support which permitted him to take the action he did. No matter what some people say, our interests overseas are growing not declining. We are increasingly dependent on imports. That in turn means that we must export more. In addition, despite what some of our eastern press would have us believe, I am confident that the people of this country will not turn their backs on the contribution that our example and support can give to those struggling for what we accept as our heritage.

I foresee an evolution in the nature of United States presence overseas. This does not imply complete withdrawal of United States forces from areas where they have maintained a presence since World War II. Over a prolonged period it may mean replacing presence in force with token presence backed by the capability to rapidly deploy reinforcements from the United States if circumstances require it. Nor does it imply that overt use of United States forces must be the rule. Presence may be sufficient to the task if our interests are manifestly apparent to all concerned and our will to persevere is credible. Hopefully such a strategy will induce abstention on the part of the major powers and discourage adventurism on the part of Third World nations themselves, either of which could be dangerously escalatory.

To review, then, I foresee three uses for United States military forces in the next two decades. First, strategic nuclear forces must balance potential enemies in order to deter nuclear war. Second, conventional general purpose forces must be sufficient to provide that type and size of contribution to NATO defenses which will buttress our allies from acceding to pressures from the Soviet Union, including any efforts to use their new naval power as a wedge against nations on the NATO flanks, or for that matter against *the* Japanese in the Pacific

Third, we need sufficient general purpose forces to deter major power dominance in the Third World and protect United States interests abroad. We need not match potential opponents measure for measure but we must demonstrate a continual willingness to maintain a sufficiently broad spectrum of capabilities so as to make overt use of force seem very risky to an adversary. Once force is actually employed in the future it will lose much of its persuasive power. Furthermore, despite the trend I mentioned earlier there is always a danger that forces in war will be less susceptible to political control. This makes it even more important that our military organization and our diplomatic pronouncements are credible so that we need resort to combat only rarely. Latent force will be the most useful weapon in the decade ahead.

This brings me to the third topic I should like to touch upon this evening. That is some of the problems which the United States military must deal with in the next few years. As I indicated earlier the principal task of United States military forces should be deterrence. This demands that the military profession relook at how we shape and employ our military in light of the changing perils of force and aspirations of many people to avoid its use. We must be more concerned with perceptions of the opponent than we have in the past, while at the same time being careful not

to neglect the force requirements which would be necessary should hostilities actually occur. In the past few years, we have used a set of possible war scenarios as justification for structuring our forces. We have tended to pick the worst case as criteria for force and individual weapons design and assumed that preparing for a worst case automatically gave us the capability to handle less demanding wars elsewhere in the world. Vietnam taught us the danger of this approach. The Navy is consciously endeavoring to achieve a more balanced force consisting of a few very capable and relatively expensive units together with a somewhat larger number of units which are less costly yet still capable of performing a spectrum of tasks, particularly in areas where the threat is not as large as it is in the worst case scenario. Absence of a clearly defined threat scenario such as we have had for the Cold War period will make it much more difficult to predict future force level requirements.

Assuming that we can learn to cope with this more difficult task of identifying and explaining requirements for latent military force we face an increasingly difficult task in convincing the Congress and the public of our long term requirements. The general public would like to forget Vietnam and the military and concentrate on domestic problems. Unfortunately, it requires 7 to 10 years to produce sophisticated weapons, so the military must procure in time of peace what it may need in war.

In addition to problems involving hardware modernization which tend to receive the greatest publicity, all the services face unprecedented personnel problems. Vietnam brought us the opportunities of a stable well paid all volunteer force, but the disadvantages of having to compete in the marketplace for talented people.

I think it is safe to say that there will have to be a series of adjustments, some dramatic, over the next several years to tailor the compensation programs, terms of enlistment, and recruiting programs to meet the special needs of each service. For example, the Army has had difficulty meeting its recruiting goals for the past six months. On the other hand the Air Force more than met its goal in July and the Navy was very close to its goal. Each service may evolve radically different programs to correct such imbalances.

We in the military will be challenged to retain our most talented men and women. Perhaps one answer might be to offer young people the opportunity to contract before they commence military service for a decade of military service in exchange for graduate level education. This medium term of service would provide educational advantage to our youth and provide the services with highly trained individuals without committing either party to a long term contract. The service would not be burdened with an excess of people who must be

retained until statutory retirement. The individual would be assured of a marketable skill to provide him with job security when his service contract expired. A similar program could be instituted to obtain the technical skills needed in the enlisted ranks.

There are many other/manpower management questions which will require some in depth study accompanied by much trial and error experimentation. Many of our current operating procedures and equipment designs need reevaluation in view of the fact that men are now much less a free good than they were only three years ago. The military can learn a great deal from civilian industry and the academic world, I am sure. In order to facilitate transfer of ideas we might want to develop programs to accept civilians into the military at their mid-career points for limited periods of service or even for the remainder of their productive years. I do not rule out the possibility of accepting individuals into the services at the flag and general officer level if they have specific skills that are required.

Naturally, there will be some problems with job security and retirement benefits, but these questions are of concern to the nation at large. We are all going to have to come to grips with the problem of providing vested retirement credits to a mobile work force.

I would like to provide ample opportunity for questions so I will close my formal remarks by quickly reviewing three major points which I hope you will consider carefully:

First - military force must be and will be subjected to much more comprehensive political control in the future. This control to be effective will demand a more enlightened, continuous, less emotional public interest in the problems of military security than we have experienced in this century.

Second - the level of military forces will not revert to what we knew in the 1930's because geography is no longer our defensive shield. We will be required to maintain forces which complement those of other nations and supplement a system of arms agreements which may grow more and more comprehensive. Many forces will be designed and deployed primarily to deter war rather than primarily to engage in actual sustained combat. Latent force will be a much more powerful influence than overt force.

Third - social change, coupled with the requirement for substantial active duty military forces and a ready reserve will place unprecedented demands for talented military personnel at a time when military service is less popular than ever. We who now hold the top management positions in the uniformed services are continually exploring new ways to attract and keep good people working with us.

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Which brings me to the second point which I should like to discuss with you, that is, the present world order and what demands this may generate for United States military force. General recognition by the superpowers that there is rough nuclear parity, and that this condition is likely to continue for some time in the future, coupled with competing domestic requirements, have led to the current atmosphere of detente.

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Speaking from the viewpoint of military professionals who will have to be responsible for national security if detente fails, it seems to me that:

- ° Detente is a fragile thing which we all hope will continue to grow.
- ° If the existence of military force imperils detente, an imbalance of force would be particularly dangerous. In order to have detente, each side must perceive a sense of security. In the present atmosphere, security will continue to consist of a series of recognized (although muted) threats that both sides feel willing and able to counter. It would be mere wishful thinking to conclude that threats no longer exist because sabers are not rattled, but merely carried at the ready.
- ° Although I share the concern of many that the Soviets may be using detente only as a short term

tactic, we must give detente a chance.' The task of military professionals must be to advise the President, the Congress, and the general public of the risks inherent in each agreement which is proposed. We must also be alert to the fact that security is not necessarily synonymous with more weaponry. I would hope that in time we may also convince our Soviet colleagues that this is true.

- ° Detente will only be preserved if all parties come to trust the word and intent of the others through a series of gradual mutual adjustments in armaments. For the near term this may mean retaining what is obviously enough power to devastate each side several times over, because one or both sides may feel more secure with a large margin of retaliatory capability.

We must understand that whereas the United States has a tradition of geographic security, the Russian perception of security is profoundly influenced by a long history of being invaded from both the East and the West. The Soviets will perceive a requirement for a large military force for the foreseeable future in order to:

- ° Deter China
- ° Police the East European satellites
- ° Insure domestic security in a nation composed of many different nationalities
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We must also realize that there is not the same tradition of dislike for a large standing army as in our country. Nor is there any possibility of meaningful public dissent which would inhibit Soviet leadership from retaining a sizeable military establishment.

Thus, I foresee United States military power as being necessary in the next decade or two to provide strategic balance in three areas.

First, we must, by a careful combination of treaties, protocols, and strategic nuclear forces, maintain a rough balance among all the nuclear powers. Contrary to the hopes of many, this is not likely to lead to general and complete disarmament; rather it will be a continuing effort, hopefully multilateral, to exercise control over a fluctuating level of strategic armaments. This effort will be complicated by the continuing development of new weapons technology, possibly addition of new members to the nuclear club, and continuing shifts in relative economic power and political alignment among all nation states.

Rather than accepting agreement limiting one or two types of armament as a rationale for drastic cutbacks in all types of military forces, we must continue to proceed carefully toward arms limitations covering all types of weapons. Simultaneously, we must maintain the forces we do have at a high state of combat readiness and pursue a steady program of research and development, and modernization of weapons systems to counter potential threats.

Our goal should be to achieve as many freezes as we can negotiate on expensive new systems such as ABM. I strongly believe that it is impossible to prevent new technological discoveries by legislation, but we can control the application of new technology to weapons systems by mutual agreement among nations. This makes it imperative that we have a well managed ongoing Research and Development program and demonstrate a willingness to proceed with new weapons programs until we can reach specific agreements with other nations. We must learn from the mistakes of the 1930's and resolve not only to seek agreement on as many political and military issues as we can, but also to compete effectively in those areas where there is yet no arms limitation agreement. This is in essence the "bargaining-chip" strategy which we are currently trying to implement.

I see no immediate alternative to the strategy of mutual assured destruction which is the present basis for strategic deterrence. I should like to emphasize that mutual assured destruction need not necessarily be a strategy aimed at civilian populations.

In order to supplant mutual assured destruction, a successor strategy must contain built in positive incentives to dissuade any party from attacking the territory of the others. One solution to our current dilemma might be to so

thoroughly intermingle the economic interests of each nation state within the territory of the others that there would be a mutual self interest in not destroying the others' property. This raises questions of relations between multinational economic institutions and national sovereignty. Such a plan would also require juxtaposition of strategic weapons systems and economic complexes, at least in the initial stages, in order to preclude either side from opting for a counter-force strategy. Perhaps someday a melding of economic interests will provide a strong incentive for nation states to desist from threatening one another. However, I am not optimistic that it will occur in the next decade. Therefore, our first concern must be to maintain nuclear parity.

The second use for United States military forces must be to contribute to the strategic balance in Western Europe. This does not necessarily mean that the present force levels and the nature of weapons deployed must remain fixed in their current status.

Since the early 1960's, the United States has subscribed to a strategy of flexible response to possible Soviet incursions against NATO European territory. We have advocated that sufficient conventional forces be deployed by all the NATO allies to provide for a breathing spell between the first incursion by Warsaw Pact forces and the time when it might become necessary to escalate to nuclear war. Our allies have reluctantly agreed to this strategy and have contributed substantially to conventional forces in Europe. We in turn have attempted to provide a capability for our military to fight a sustained campaign in Central Europe by building a force with a heavy emphasis on logistic support.

There are several reasons why this strategy needs to be carefully reevaluated:

- The Soviets have not designed a force for prolonged struggle. Rather, they have emphasized the capability for a short massive blow which could not be sustained very long because their logistics train is inadequate for the task.

- o Our allies have designed forces with a potential for perhaps more sustained combat than the Warsaw Pact but certainly not for a prolonged conventional war.
- o If we attempt to afford the dollars to support a sustained conventional war fighting capability in Central Europe there will be little else in our inventory of military capability.
- o The Soviets are unlikely to attempt such a war because of the danger of escalation; because of the threat of China and because of their trouble retaining tight controls on their current East European satellites. They are more interested in exercising a larger measure of political influence over Western Europe than in conquering it and having to control it like the eastern satellites. For these reasons we may find it advantageous to:
 - ° Bargain together with our Allies for Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR); perhaps difficult to achieve because of Soviet requirements for internal security.
 - ° Restructure our forces in Europe with greater emphasis on defensive weapons, smaller more mobile units, and redeployment within Europe based on the realities of the terrain rather than artificial constraints such as national boundaries and historical accident resulting from World War II.
 - ° Reduce the logistic tail necessary for a long conventional war and increase the ratio of combat troops vis-a-vis support troops in Europe. We should also

the United States as a substitute for the lengthy individual tours with the large number of dependents which characterize present deployments.

° Plan on rapid small unit replacement and reinforcement from the United States in the event of hostilities or increased tension, rather than individual replacement as is presently contemplated.

The mission of United States forces committed to Europe will most likely evolve from one of fighting a sustained conflict to that of supporting Western Europe against political pressure from the Soviets and maintaining a capability to fight a short, perhaps unexpected defensive war against powerful but short-legged offensive forces.

A third use of United States military force will be to deter major power dominance in the Third World. Only the United States can perform this function. Thus there is some rationalization of effort here with our European allies carrying a larger share of the central front load, and we tending to the free world's interests around the globe. Note that I did not say that we should police the Third World. United States interests will best be served for the foreseeable future if Third World nations are permitted the freedom to work out their own destinies. Unfortunately, they may not be left alone simply because the United States may choose to withdraw forces. The Soviet Union's naval building program,

coupled with its radical change in deployment patterns over the past decade, the many statements by their CNO, Admiral Gorshkov, and their interest in obtaining basing and logistics support facilities in strategic locations, all point to new Soviet awareness of the persuasive power of military presence.

Even though the United States will be less likely to use overt force in Third World areas, the capability for a counter presence will be necessary. Without a reasonable countervailing capability on our part, we can expect Third World nations to succumb to military pressures. For example, one might reasonably speculate as to whether or not Egyptian President Sadat would have been able to ask the Soviets to remove their "advisors" and combat forces from Egyptian territory if the United States 6th Fleet had not been present in the Mediterranean Sea. Even though the United States is not a formal ally of Egypt our visible military force on the scene might well have been the latent potential support which permitted him to take the action he did. No matter what some people say, our interests overseas are growing not declining. We are increasingly dependent on imports. That in turn means that we must export more. In addition, despite what some of our eastern press would have us believe, I am confident that the people of this country will not turn their backs on the contribution that our example and support can give to those struggling for what we accept as our heritage.

I foresee an evolution in the nature of United States presence overseas. This does not imply complete withdrawal of United States forces from areas where they have maintained a presence since World War II. Over a prolonged period it may mean replacing presence in force with token presence backed by the capability to rapidly deploy reinforcements from the United States if circumstances require it. Nor does it imply that overt use of United States forces must be the rule. Presence may be sufficient to the task if our interests are manifestly apparent to all concerned and our will to persevere is credible. Hopefully such a strategy will induce abstention on the part of the major powers and discourage adventurism on the part of Third World nations themselves, either of which could be dangerously escalatory.

To review, then, I foresee three uses for United States military forces in the next two decades. First, strategic nuclear forces must balance potential enemies in order to deter nuclear war. Second, conventional general purpose forces must be sufficient to provide that type and size of contribution to NATO defenses which will buttress our allies from acceding to pressures from the Soviet Union, including any efforts to use their new naval power as a wedge against nations on the NATO flanks, or for that matter against the Japanese in the Pacific

Third, we need sufficient general purpose forces to deter major power dominance in the Third World and protect United States interests abroad. We need not match potential opponents measure for measure but we must demonstrate a continual willingness to maintain a sufficiently broad spectrum of capabilities so as to make overt use of force seem very risky to an adversary. Once force is actually employed in the future it will lose much of its persuasive power. Furthermore, despite the trend /I mentioned earlier there is always a danger that forces in war will be less susceptible to political control. This makes it even more important that our military organization and our diplomatic pronouncements are credible so that we need resort to combat only rarely. Latent force will be the most useful weapon in the decade ahead.

This brings me to the third topic I should like to touch upon this evening. That is some of the problems which the United States military must deal with in the next few years. As I indicated earlier the principal task of United States military forces should be deterrence. This demands that the military profession relook at how we shape and employ our military in light of the changing perils of force and aspirations of many people to avoid its use. We must be more concerned with perceptions of the opponent than we have in the past, while at the same time being careful not

to neglect the force requirements which would be necessary should hostilities actually occur. In the past few years, we have used a set of possible war scenarios as justification for structuring our forces. We have tended to pick the worst case as criteria for force and individual weapons design and assumed that preparing for a worst case automatically gave us the capability to handle less demanding wars elsewhere in the world. Vietnam taught us the danger of this approach. The Navy is consciously endeavoring to achieve a more balanced force consisting of a few very capable and relatively expensive units together with a somewhat larger number of units which are less costly yet still capable of performing a spectrum of tasks, particularly in areas where the threat is not as large as it is in the worst case scenario. Absence of a clearly defined threat scenario such as we have had for the Cold War period will make it much more difficult to predict future force level requirements.

Assuming that we can learn to cope with this more difficult task of identifying and explaining requirements for latent military force we face an increasingly difficult task in convincing the Congress and the public of our long term requirements. The general public would like to forget Vietnam and the military and concentrate on domestic problems. Unfortunately, it requires 7 to 10 years to produce sophisticated weapons, so the military must procure in time of peace what it may need in war.

In addition to problems involving hardware modernization which tend to receive the greatest publicity, all the services face unprecedented personnel problems. Vietnam brought us the opportunities of a stable well paid all volunteer force, but the disadvantages of having to compete in the marketplace for talented people.

I think it is safe to say that there will have to be a series of adjustments, some dramatic, over the next several years to tailor the compensation programs, terms of enlistment, and recruiting programs to meet the special needs of each service. For example, the Army has had difficulty meeting its recruiting goals for the past six months. On the other hand the Air Force more than met its goal in July and the Navy was very close to its goal. Each service may evolve radically different programs to correct such imbalances.

We in the military will be challenged to retain our most talented men and women. Perhaps one answer might be to offer young people the opportunity to contract before they commence military service for a decade of military service in exchange for graduate level education. This medium term of service would provide educational advantage to our youth and provide the services with highly trained individuals without committing either party to a long term contract. The service would not be burdened with an excess of people who must be

retained until statutory retirement. The individual would be assured of a marketable skill to provide him with job security when his service contract expired. A similar program could be instituted to obtain the technical skills needed in the enlisted ranks.

There are many other manpower management questions which will require some in depth study accompanied by much trial and error experimentation. Many of our current operating procedures and equipment designs need reevaluation in view of the fact that men are now much less a free good than they were only three years ago. The military can learn a great deal from civilian industry and the academic world, I am sure. In order to facilitate transfer of ideas we might want to develop programs to accept civilians into the military at their mid-career points for limited periods of service or even for the remainder of their productive years. I do not rule out the possibility of accepting individuals into the services at the flag and general officer level if they have specific skills that are required.

Naturally, there will be some problems with job security and retirement benefits, but these questions are of concern to the nation at large. We are all going to have to come to grips with the problem of providing vested retirement credits to a mobile work force.

I would like to provide ample opportunity for questions so I will close my formal remarks by quickly reviewing three major points which I hope you will consider carefully:

First - military force must be and will be subjected to much more comprehensive political control in the future. This control to be effective will demand a more enlightened, continuous, less emotional public interest in the problems of military security than we have experienced in this century.

Second - the level of military forces will not revert to what we knew in the 1930's because geography is no longer our defensive shield. We will be required to maintain forces which complement those of other nations and supplement a system of arms agreements which may grow more and more comprehensive. Many forces will be designed and deployed primarily to deter war rather than primarily to engage in actual sustained combat. Latent force will be a much more powerful influence than overt force.

Third - social change, coupled with the requirement for substantial active duty military forces and a ready reserve will place unprecedented demands for talented military personnel at a time when military service is less popular than ever. We who now hold the top management positions in the uniformed services are continually exploring new ways to attract and keep good people working with us.

9/27/73

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CHICAGO

Tonight I would like to share some thoughts with you concerning the future use of organized force, both in the world as a whole and as it relates to our own country.

Three topics which seem pertinent to me include: First, the general historical trend in the use of organized force and where we stand today relative to the long term trends. Second, the present state of world political order and what this portends for the employment of United States military power for the decade or two ahead. And, Third, the status of the United States military today and some of the problems it must overcome if it is to serve the national purpose successfully in the immediate future.

Turning to an assessment of the evolution of force and where we stand today, I would agree with Mr. Robert Osgood's perspective. He characterized the development of military technology from the pre-nation state era through the pre-Napoleonic era as being a relatively limited force which was gradually harnessed and made somewhat useful to the embryonic nation states of that day. From the Napoleonic Wars until the end of World War I, he traced the tremendous expansion of military power coincident with the industrial revolution in Europe and the United States, an expansion so great and so swift that political institutions of the period were unable to exercise adequate controls.

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There were attempts by governments to reduce the causes of war before World War I, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 being prominent examples.

Between World Wars I and II we had even more efforts to control military force. The Kellogg-Briand Pact renounced war as an instrument of statecraft. The widely heralded Washington and London Naval Disarmament Treaties reduced naval strength among all signatories and maintained a freeze on battleship tonnage for 15 years.

These efforts failed to prevent World War II. Which brings us to the epoch commencing in 1945 in which we live, a period characterized by Robert Osgood as the regulatory phase in the evolution of force. The advent of nuclear weapons resulted simultaneously in a tremendous increase in available destructive power and ever increasing efforts by political institutions to achieve control over the new force.

World War II seems in retrospect to have been a conflict relatively free of excessive political control. The trend since has been to ever greater political restrictions on the use of force. To name but a few outstanding examples one can cite: (1) the Truman-MacArthur showdown over Korea, (2) the establishment of centralized control in the Department of Defense, (3) the lessened reliance on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the decision making process, (4) the designation of individual bombing targets in North Vietnam

from the White House on a day to day basis, (5) and, the elaborate fail safe devices and procedures devised to control release of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union also has demonstrated continuing concern with centralized political command and control: (1) the manner in which they manipulated their forces in the Cuban missile crisis, (2) the system by which political officers are assigned to parallel regular military command down to the unit level, (3) the way in which they maintained simultaneous tactical control over all their naval units deployed around the world during Exercise OKEAN, (4) Soviet willingness to limit naval incidents at sea and sign the SALT agreements, all are symptomatic of a trend which is accelerating, at least in the developed countries and especially in the superpowers.

I do not contend that this trend is anything but healthy because it may well help to prevent accidental disaster in the future. To be sure we have a long way to go in improving our command and control organization and equipment. The system has not always worked as intended in the past. One might cite the Lavelle incident, the Arnheiter affair, or My Lai as evidence that it hasn't worked well. But I would contend that these are exceptions rather than the rule. Furthermore, the mere fact that they came to light at all is evidence of tremendous change in the scope of control which is now exercised by the United States body

politic over its military organizations. Such incidents would most likely not have come to light at all 30 years ago, first because military commanders had much greater freedom of action in the field, and second because subordinates would not so readily have taken the initiative to expose what they observed to the nation at large.

In short, civil government at least in the developed nations is beginning to react to the tremendous growth in military power which has characterized the past century and a half and is taking steps to place effective controls on organized force by both unilateral and multilateral means.

Which brings me to the second point which I should like to discuss with you, that is, the present world order and what demands this may generate for United States military force. General recognition by the superpowers that there is rough nuclear parity, and that this condition is likely to continue for some time in the future, coupled with competing domestic requirements, have led to the current atmosphere of detente.

Some observers look into the future and wishfully see no end to detente, hence no need for forces. Some look ahead and see the existence of forces as a temptation that will undo detente. Others look ahead and theorize that the foundations of peace must rest on more enduring principles than the fear of physical punishment, hence seek the elimination of force and the threat of force today.

Still others view detente as just a tactical ploy by the Russians to gain time and access to Western technology. Even some Russians are convinced of this. We read just this month of nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov warning that fundamental Soviet attitudes may not change. And, there are disturbing reports that Chairman Breshnev has told his comrades that detente is a tactic to be employed for a decade or so, at which time the Soviets will be strong enough to abandon a policy of conciliation.

Speaking from the viewpoint of military professionals who will have to be responsible for national security if detente fails, it seems to me that:

- ° Detente is a fragile thing which we all hope will continue to grow.

- ° If the existence of military force imperils detente, an imbalance of force would be particularly dangerous. In order to have detente, each side must perceive a sense of security. In the present atmosphere, security will continue to consist of a series of recognized (although muted) threats that both sides feel willing and able to counter. It would be mere wishful thinking to conclude that threats no longer exist because sabers are not rattled, but merely carried at the ready.

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tactic, we must give detente a chance. The task of military professionals must be to advise the President, the Congress, and the general public of the risks inherent in each agreement which is proposed. We must also be alert to the fact that security is not necessarily synonymous with more weaponry. I would hope that in time we may also convince our Soviet colleagues that this is true.

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- ° Deter China
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We must also realize that there is not the same tradition of dislike for a large standing army as in our country. Nor is there any possibility of meaningful public dissent which would inhibit Soviet leadership from retaining a sizeable military establishment.

Thus, I foresee United States military power as being necessary in the next decade or two to provide strategic balance in three areas.

First, we must, by a careful combination of treaties, protocols, and strategic nuclear forces, maintain a rough balance among all the nuclear powers. Contrary to the hopes of many, this is not likely to lead to general and complete disarmament; rather it will be a continuing effort, hopefully multilateral, to exercise control over a fluctuating level of strategic armaments. This effort will be complicated by the continuing development of new weapons technology, possibly addition of new members to the nuclear club, and continuing shifts in relative economic power and political alignment among all nation states.

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Our goal should be to achieve as many freezes as we can negotiate on expensive new systems such as ABM. I strongly believe that it is impossible to prevent new technological discoveries by legislation, but we can control the application of new technology to weapons systems by mutual agreement among nations. This makes it imperative that we have a well managed ongoing Research and Development program and demonstrate a willingness to proceed with new weapons programs until we can reach specific agreements with other nations. We must learn from the mistakes of the 1930's and resolve not only to seek agreement on as many political and military issues as we can, but also to compete effectively in those areas where there is yet no arms limitation agreement. This is in essence the "bargaining-chip" strategy which we are currently trying to implement.

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thoroughly intermingle the economic interests of each nation state within the territory of the others that there would be a mutual self interest in not destroying the others' property. This raises questions of relations between multinational economic institutions and national sovereignty. Such a plan would also require juxtaposition of strategic weapons systems and economic complexes, at least in the initial stages, in order to preclude either side from opting for a counter-force strategy. Perhaps someday a melding of economic interests will provide a strong incentive for nation states to desist from threatening one another. However, I am not optimistic that it will occur in the next decade. Therefore, our first concern must be to maintain nuclear parity.

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to neglect the force requirements which would be necessary should hostilities actually occur. In the past few years, we have used a set of possible war scenarios as justification for structuring our forces. We have tended to pick the worst case as criteria for force and individual weapons design and assumed that preparing for a worst case automatically gave us the capability to handle less demanding wars elsewhere in the world. Vietnam taught us the danger of this approach. The Navy is consciously endeavoring to achieve a more balanced force consisting of a few very capable and relatively expensive units together with a somewhat larger number of units which are less costly yet still capable of performing a spectrum of tasks, particularly in areas where the threat is not as large as it is in the worst case scenario. Absence of a clearly defined threat scenario such as we have had for the Cold War period will make it much more difficult to predict future force level requirements.

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I think it is safe to say that there will have to be a series of adjustments, some dramatic, over the next several years to tailor the compensation programs, terms of enlistment, and recruiting programs to meet the special needs of each service. For example, the Army has had difficulty meeting its recruiting goals for the past six months. On the other hand the Air Force more than met its goal in July and the Navy was very close to its goal. Each service may evolve radically different programs to correct such imbalances.

We in the military will be challenged to retain our most talented men and women. Perhaps one answer might be to offer young people the opportunity to contract before they commence military service for a decade of military service in exchange for graduate level education. This medium term of service would provide educational advantage to our youth and provide the services with highly trained individuals without committing either party to a long term contract. The service would not be burdened with an excess of people who must be

retained until statutory retirement. The individual would be assured of a marketable skill to provide him with job security when his service contract expired. A similar program could be instituted to obtain the technical skills needed in the enlisted ranks.

There are many other manpower management questions which will require some in depth study accompanied by much trial and error experimentation. Many of our current operating procedures and equipment designs need reevaluation in view of the fact that men are now much less a free good than they were only three years ago. The military can learn a great deal from civilian industry and the academic world, I am sure. In order to facilitate transfer of ideas we might want to develop programs to accept civilians into the military at their mid-career points for limited periods of service or even for the remainder of their productive years. I do not rule out the possibility of accepting individuals into the services at the flag and general officer level if they have specific skills that are required.

Naturally, there will be some problems with job security and retirement benefits, but these questions are of concern to the nation at large. We are all going to have to come to grips with the problem of providing vested retirement credits to a mobile work force.

I would like to provide ample opportunity for questions so I will close my formal remarks by quickly reviewing three major points which I hope you will consider carefully:

First - military force must be and will be subjected to much more comprehensive political control in the future. This control to be effective will demand a more enlightened, continuous, less emotional public interest in the problems of military security than we have experienced in this century.

Second - the level of military forces will not revert to what we knew in the 1930's because geography is no longer our defensive shield. We will be required to maintain forces which complement those of other nations and supplement a system of arms agreements which may grow more and more comprehensive. Many forces will be designed and deployed primarily to deter war rather than primarily to engage in actual sustained combat. Latent force will be a much more powerful influence than overt force.

Third - social change, coupled with the requirement for substantial active duty military forces and a ready reserve will place unprecedented demands for talented military personnel at a time when military service is less popular than ever. We who now hold the top management positions in the uniformed services are continually exploring new ways to attract and keep good people working with us.